Guidance on what will constitute personal information for the purposes of s 47F in the FOI Act
29 June 2026
Case Note: ‘BAE’ and Department of Home Affairs (Freedom of Information)
This recent decision of the Freedom of Information Commissioner, Alice Linacre (Commissioner), provides useful guidance on personal privacy exemption in s 47F of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act). The decision is particularly notable for its discussion of two recent Administrative Review Tribunal authorities, Bachelard and Madden, and the evolving approach to the concept of ‘personal information’ (paragraphs [34]-[39]).
Background
The Applicant sought access to documents concerning their detention and questioning at Sydney Information Airport in 2019. During the IC review, the Department submitted that the names of the Australian Border Force (ABF) officers appearing in the relevant document were conditionally exempt under s 47F, because disclosure would involve unreasonable disclosure of the relevant officers’ personal information. Material will be conditionally exempt under s 47F if it contains ‘personal information’ and disclosure in response to the applicant’s FOI request would be ‘unreasonable’ (s 47F(1)).
Was the material ‘personal information’?
A key issue in this matter was whether the names of the officers constituted ‘personal information’ for the purposes of the FOI Act. The Commissioner noted that, for the purposes of s 47F, ‘personal information’ under the FOI Act has the same meaning as the equivalent term in the Privacy Act 1988. This definition is as follows:
personal information means information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable:
(a) whether the information or opinion is true or not; and
(b) whether the information or opinion is recorded in a material form or not.
In considering this issue, the Commissioner examined the Tribunal’s reasoning in the recent decision of Bachelard and Australian Federal Police (Freedom of Information) [2025] ARTA 2416 (Bachelard). At paragraph [35], The Commissioner noted Justice Kyrou’s observation that in order for the exemption in s 47F to apply, the information must be ‘about’ an individual rather than simply refer to them. The IC noted that Justice Kyrou further explained that information will be ‘about an individual’ if the individual is a subject matter of the information. Where information refers to a named individual, in the context where the individual is not the subject of the information, the information would not be ‘personal information’ of that individual.
The Commissioner also considered the recent Tribunal decision of Madden; Secretary, Services Australia (Freedom of Information) [2026] ARTA 423 (Madden), which concerned the names, job titles and contact details of non-SES staff. In contrast to Bachelard, the decision in Madden adopted a broader approach to what would amount to personal information. As noted by the Commissioner at paragraph [36], the decision in Madden suggests that the ability to ascertain an individual’s identity may be sufficient to meet the definition.
After considering these decisions, the Commissioner ultimately determined that the relevant material in this matter had the features of personal information required by s 47F and reflected in both Bachelard and Madden.
At paragraph [37], the Commissioner considered whether the information was ‘about’ an identifiable person. At paragraph [38], the Commissioner noted that while it was apparent that the documents included information about the performance of public roles by the ABF officers, it was also apparent that the ABF officers work in a sensitive operational environment and have a significant connection to the subject of the documents. The Commissioner was satisfied that this distinguished the case from circumstances involving senior executive officers in relation to which there would a more remote connection between the actions taken by the relevant agency employee and members of the community.
The Commissioner was therefore satisfied that the material at issue (being the names of ABF officers) constituted ‘personal information’ for the purposes of s 47F of the FOI Act.
Would disclosure of that ‘personal information’ be unreasonable?
Having found the names of the officers constituted ‘personal information’, the Commissioner turned to the question of unreasonableness under s 47F.
After considering the material at issue and the parties’ submissions, the Commissioner accepted that disclosure of the material would be unreasonable in the circumstances. This was because the information was not well known or publicly available and the individuals are not known to be associated with the subject matter of the documents. Having weighed the relevant factors, the Commissioner found that, on balance, disclosure of the material at issue would involve an unreasonable disclosure of personal information and was therefore conditionally exempt under s 47 F.
Whether access would be contrary to the public interest (s 11A(5))
After considering the relevant factors listed in s 11B(3) of the FOI Act and the parties’ submissions, the Commissioner further found that disclosure of the conditionally exempt material would be contrary to the public interest.
Conclusion
This decision provides useful guidance on the application of s 47F of the FOI Act. The decision demonstrates that the concept of personal information under s 47F continues to develop following Bachelard and Madden. While Bachelard emphasises whether information is truly ‘about’ an individual, Madden highlights the importance of identifiability. BAE suggests that, particularly in operational law enforcement contexts, both considerations may support a finding that an officer’s name constitutes personal information deserving protection under the FOI Act.
If your agency requires advice or assistance with the processing of FOI requests, please reach out to Chantal Tipene and our team of leading FOI specialists would be happy to assist.
